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Introduction  
This case study research explores how and why the 
National Football League (NFL) Rams both arrived 
in St. Louis (1995) and departed St. Louis (2016). In 
order to address these questions, through archival 
and secondary data, the research examines the 
unique interrelated history of St. Louis and the NFL, 
including both economics and public financing.1  
 
Case studies are utilized in answering “how” and/or 
“why” questions, particularly when the researcher 
has minimal to no control over events and the 
primary focus is on contemporary phenomenon 
within a reality context. These types of case studies 
are often explanatory in nature, complemented by 
exploratory and descriptive research. In general, the 
how and why require researchers to follow 






Even though the NFL is economically the largest 
professional sports team league in America and 
substantially bigger than its closest competitor, 
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1 In order to more fully understand this article, please first read: 
Eric Click, “One Development Project, Two Economic Tales: 
The St. Louis Cardinals’ Busch Stadium and Ballpark Village,” 
Missouri Policy Journal 2 (Fall/Winter 2014): 21-34. 
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3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 1-6. 
Major League Baseball (MLB), dedicated academic 
economic NFL literature is relatively small, 
especially in comparison to MLB. However, 
academic economic NFL literature is starting to 
increase, both in frequency and relevance.3 Relative 
to the NFL economic structure, John Vrooman, 
Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University, 
states, 
 
Sports leagues are unique in that individual 
clubs are mutually interdependent in their 
cooperative production of competitive games. 
As joint members of natural cartels each sports 
team is only as strong as its weakest opponent. 
Over the last half century the National Football 
League (NFL) has become the most 
economically powerful sports league in the 
world largely because it has also been the most 
egalitarian. In 2010 NFL clubs pooled and 
shared two-thirds of over $8 billion in revenues 
among 32 franchises. The underlying source of 
NFL economic strength has been a survivalist 
“league-think” mentality that developed from 
the outset of the NFL-AFL war 1960–1966. 
Evenly shared national media money has grown 
at a compound rate of 12% from $47 million 
annually at the time of the actual NFL merger in 
1970 to $4 billion under 2012–2013 TV contract 
extensions. Over the last 2 decades, however, a 
major threat to league-thinking solidarity has 
merged from an individualist counterrevolution 
in unshared venue revenue. During the luxury-
seat stadium building frenzy that followed the 
watershed 1993 Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA), the proportion of team-
specific venue revenue has doubled from 10 to 
20% of total revenue. This once-tight syndicate 
now finds itself split into those teams with new 
venues and those without.4 
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Economics of the National Football League: The State of the 
The St. Louis Rams: The Greatest Public Financing Show on Earth 
Eric Click, Ph.D. 
Park University  
Number 4 (Fall/Winter 2016-2017) | Missouri Policy Journal | 25 
 
 
Even before the most recent CBA, from 1991 
through 2011, NFL team values increase over 12%, 
while profits grow 7.7%. Relative to these figures, 
owners are leveraging their teams better, including 
inclusion in large entertainment complexes.5 
Referring to NFL franchise values, locations, and 
stadium economics, Jason Winfree, Associate 
Professor at the University of Idaho in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
Sociology, concludes,  
 
This study goes on to investigate how a team’s 
stadium is related to this value. While media 
contracts explain part of the increasing values of 
NFL teams, new stadiums also play a crucial 
role. However, the public does not see the same 
economic benefits as the team, even though they 
often pay for a large part of the stadium. 
Because of the market structure of the NFL, 
they are able to extract public funds for these 
stadiums. Thus, even though fans may not want 
their team to leave, it is difficult to see stadium 
subsidies as a good economic investment.6 
 
However, according to Taxpayers Protection 
Alliance (TPA), a non-profit non-partisan 
organization, from 1995 through 2015, 29 out of 31 
NFL stadiums received public subsidies, totaling 
nearly $7 billion.7 In addition, according to 
Brookings Institution, an independent nonprofit 
public policy organization, since 2000, through the 
usage of municipal bonds in stadium construction 
financing, which are federal tax-exempt, NFL 
stadium federal subsidies total $1.11 billion out of 
$3.2 billion total stadium subsidies. Further, if the 
                                                                                                       
Art, ed. Kevin G. Quinn, Sports Economics, Management and 
Policy 3, series ed. Dennis Coates (New York: Springer, 2012), 
7-8. 
5 Jason Winfree, “NFL Franchise Values, Locations, and 
Stadium Economics,” in The Economics of the National 
Football League: The State of the Art, ed. Kevin G. Quinn, 
Sports Economics, Management and Policy 3, series ed. Dennis 
Coates (New York: Springer, 2012), 52. 
6 Ibid., 52-53. 
7 Taxpayers Protection Alliance, Sacking Taxpayers: How NFL 
Stadium Subsidies Waste Money and Fall Short on Their 
Promises of Economic Development, (September 2015): 1, 
accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://protectingtaxpayers.org/assets/files/NFL-Subsidies-
report-Sept2015.pdf. 
high-income bond holders are included, which 
receive federal tax breaks, the NFL stadium federal 
revenue loss totals $1.29 billion out of $3.7 billion 
total stadium federal revenue loss.8 
Signed August 4, 2011, after the longest league labor 
stoppage in NFL history, 136-day lockout,9 the 
current CBA, which expires after the 2020 season,10 
is the most significant NFL economic restructuring 
since the 1993 agreement.11 The significant changes 
primarily impact four areas: player and health safety, 
retired player benefits, draft/free agency system, and 
entry level compensation system.12 One, all team and 
league revenues are eligible for player 
compensation. Two, the salary cap is set so players 
can share within 47-48.5% of total league revenues, 
which is based upon 55% league media revenues, 
45% NFL Ventures revenue, 40% local team 
revenues. Three, in 2011-2012, the league must 
spend at least 99% of cap. In 2013-2020, the league 
must spend at least 95% of cap, and individual teams 
must spend at least 89% of cap. Four, rookie salaries 
are connected to veteran salaries based upon their 
pick location and position. Five, league minimum 
players receive a $55,000 increase in 2011 and 
$15,000 each additional year. Six, a “legacy fund” 
                                                          
8 Ted Gayer, Austin J. Drukker, and Alexander K. Gold, “Why 
the Federal Government Should Stop Spending Billions on 
Private Sports Stadiums,” Brookings, September 8, 2016, 






9 Nate Davis, “NFL, Players Announce New 10-Year Labor 





10 “NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement: August 4, 2011,” 
NFLPA, accessed September 5, 2016, 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/G
eneral/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Bookmarked.pdf. 
11 Kevin G. Quinn, “Directions for Future NFL Research and 
the New CBA,” in The Economics of the National Football 
League: The State of the Art, ed. Kevin G. Quinn, Sports 
Economics, Management and Policy 3, series ed. Dennis 
Coates (New York: Springer, 2012), 325. 
12 “NFL Clubs Approve Comprehensive Agreement,” NFL, 
July 26, 2012, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d820e6311/article/nfl-
clubs-approve-comprehensive-agreement. 
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for pre-1993 pensions is created worth $620 million, 
with 49% paid by current player revenues and 51% 
paid by team owners. Seven, player contracts have a 
three-year injury guarantee, and all players qualify 
for the NFL medical plan for life. Eight, players 
have less practice full-contact. Nine, through 2013, 
the regular season is 16 games with four preseason 
games, and the National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA) can veto changes beyond. 
Ten, both the league and the union mutually agree to 
dispute arbitration over revenue, salary caps, and 
free agency.13 
 
In 2015, after being tax-exempt since 1942, the NFL 
ends its central league office 501(c)(6) status, which 
alleviates both negative “distraction” and publicity.14 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) states, “Section 
501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code provides for 
the exemption of business leagues, chambers of 
commerce, real estate boards, boards of trade and 
professional football leagues, which are not 
organized for profit and no part of the net earnings 
of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.”15 However, NFL teams, 
which are not tax-exempt, already pay taxes, 
including on profit, player salaries, and merchandise 
sales. While the National Basketball Association 
(NBA) and National Hockey League (NHL) still 
maintain their status, like MLB, which eliminated its 
status in 2007, in return for the nominal taxes the 
NFL will pay, the NFL no longer has to file IRS-990 
Forms that publicly disclose specific financial 
information, including key executive salaries.16 
In 2015, the fortunes of the NFL continued to rise. 
Relative to 2015 NFL team values, for the ninth 
straight year, the Dallas Cowboys maintained the 
highest ranking.17 Forbes team valuation 
methodology includes, 
                                                          
13 Quinn, “Directions for Future NFL Research and the New 
CBA,” 331. 
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Street Journal, April 28, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/nfl-to-end-tax-exempt-status-
1430241845. 
15 Internal Revenue Service. “Other Non-Profits — Business 
Leagues.” IRS.gov, accessed September 5, 2016, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/other-non-
profits/business-leagues. 
16 Clegg, “NFL to End Tax-Exempt Status.” 
17 Mike Ozanian, “The Most Valuable Teams in the NFL,” 
Forbes, September 14, 2015, accessed September 5, 2016, 
Quick huddle: Team values are enterprise values 
(equity plus net debt). The values for the Atlanta 
Falcons and Minnesota Vikings were adjusted 
upward to somewhat reflected [sic] their new 
stadiums (the former in 2017, the latter in 2016), 
though, as was the case with the 49ers this year, 
we will not have a complete handle on the 
impact the new stadiums will have until they 
finish their first seasons in their new digs. Also, 
we did not adjust this year’s values for the San 
Diego [Chargers], Oakland Raiders and St. 
Louis Rams to reflect the possibility one or 
more of these teams will be moving to Los 
Angeles because we don’t know who is going. 
Revenue and operating income are for the 2014 
season, net of revenue sharing and stadium debt 
service. Our goal is to measure cash in versus 
cash out. The NFL suggested to owners that 
they accrue for the cost of the concussion 
lawsuit by deducting the entire $27 million cost 
per team from profits in 2014. But we omitted 
that expense from our operating income figures 
because the case is being appealed and the 
actual cash outlay for that settlement will be 
over several years. Revenue from non-NFL 
events is included where applicable. We 
gathered our information from the teams, public 
documents (for stadium leases and public debt), 
sports bankers, credit rating agencies like 
Moody’s and Fitch, network executives, and 
media experts like SNL Kagan.18 
 
While the Cowboys have not been to the Super Bowl 
in over 20 years, owner Jerry Jones and the AT&T 
Stadium receive a $4 billion valuation. The 
Cowboys generated an American sports team record 
revenue of $620 million, while also ranking first in 
average NFL attendance (90,000), premium seating 
revenue ($120 million) and non-NFL events stadium 
revenue ($30 million). After the Cowboys, other big 
market teams also playing in team-operated stadiums 
encompass the top five team valuations: New 
England Patriots ($3.2 billion), Washington 
Redskins ($2.85 billion), New York Giants ($2.8 
billion) and San Francisco 49ers ($2.7 billion). After 
moving into the new $1.2 billion Levi Stadium, in 
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one year, the 49ers valuation increased by 69%, with 
team revenue increasing 160%.19 Mike Ozanian, 
Forbes, contends, 
 
The NFL’s rising tide has lifted all boats. The 
average NFL team is worth $1.97 billion, 38% 
more than last year. The gain was fueled by a 
$39 million increase in national revenue for 
each of the league’s 32 teams. The NFL is 
unlike any other sports league in that from an 
operating standpoint every team is immensely 
profitable. In 2014, operating income (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization) averaged $76 million for the 
league’s 32 teams, ranging from a high of $270 
million (Cowboys) to a low of $25 million 
(Atlanta Falcons). Even if they don’t play in a 
big market or profit from hosting non-NFL 
events at their stadium, owners can still make an 
obscene amount of money if they consistently 
put a top-notch product on the field.20 
 
In 2016, globally, the NFL’s Dallas Cowboys are 
also the world’s most valuable team, which is the 
first time a non-soccer team has held this ranking. 
Overall, out of the existing 32 NFL teams, 27 NFL 
team valuations rank in the top 50 globally.21 Forbes 
global team valuation results and methodology 
include, 
 
The average franchise in the top 50 is worth 
$2.2 billion versus $1.75 billion a year ago. The 
breakdown by sport is 27 NFL teams (versus 20 
last year), seven MLB (versus 12), eight NBA 
(versus 10) and eight European soccer (versus 
seven). The New York Knicks are the most 
valuable NBA team at $3 billion and rank No. 7 
overall. No F1, Nascar or hockey teams made 
the grade. The minimum to make the cut is up 
20% to $1.48 billion (Jacksonville Jaguars). 
There are 76 franchises worth at least $1 billion 
                                                          
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Kurt Badenhausen, “Dallas Cowboys Head the World’s 50 
Most Valuable Sports Teams of 2016,” Forbes, July 13, 2016, 




by our count. Our franchise values are based on 
the Forbes valuations done over the past year for 
NFL, NHL, NBA, MLB, F1, soccer and Nascar. 
Some team values have shifted since our last 
published reports, but they are not reflected 
here. Most notably, the former St. Louis Rams 
relocated to Los Angeles, increasing the team’s 
value from our September estimate of $1.46 
billion. Forbes’ team values are enterprise 
values (equity plus debt) based on current 
stadium deals (unless a new stadium is 
pending).22 
 
In 2014, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell makes 
$34.1 million, including bonuses of $26.5 million. In 
nine years, his salary totals $180.5 million, 
averaging $20 million per year. While critics call for 
his termination based on recent league scandals and 
negative publicity, Goodell continues to increase the 
profits of the owners. As a result, in 2014, 
comparing the NFL revenue to pay of other 
professional league commissioners, he may be 
underpaid. Goodell’s $34.1 million is only 0.26% of 
league revenue compared to other commissioners: 
MLB ($26 million -0.33%), NBA ($20 million - 
0.44%), NHL ($10.5 million - 0.26%), and MLS 
($3.5 million - 0.76%).23 Furthermore, in 2016, 
recent projections expect NFL revenues to exceed 
$13 billion, increasing over 50% from 2010. 
Moreover, these projections are over halfway to 
Goodell’s goal of $25 billion by 2027. Since 
announcing the goal in 2010 when NFL revenues 
were $8.5 billion, the NFL annual revenue growth is 
$750 million.24 Relative to the increasing bottom-
line of the NFL continuing, Ozanian declares, 
 
Has the NFL peaked? Don’t make me laugh. 
The league is about to build a new stadium near 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 Alex Reimer, “Roger Goodell Might Actually be 
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Los Angeles, one that will be so audacious—the 
grandest reality console in the land—that it 
could make the one in Dallas seem humble. 
That L.A. stadium will make money for 
whichever team plays there, but the big picture 
is that it will serve as the show biz platform for 
the league. Think concerts and entertainment 
laden with NFL endorsers such as Hyundai, 
Visa and Microsoft. And there is more fantasy 
(or is it reality?) TV . . . on the way. Meanwhile, 
the Green Bay Packers, a team about as far 
away from Hollywood as you can get 
(spiritually speaking) are building Titletown 
District—a destination area to be created on 
approximately 34 acres of land immediately 
west of Lambeau Field—to capitalize on their 
fanatical fan base.25 
 
St. Louis and the NFL 
In 1923, St. Louis briefly has a team entry in the 
NFL. Then, in 1934, the Cincinnati Gunners relocate 
to St. Louis, playing three games before folding.26 
Eventually, St. Louis hosts two additional NFL team 
relocations: the St. Louis Cardinals and the St. Louis 
Rams. 
 
The Cardinals (1960-1987) 
 
The Cardinals, originally located in Chicago and 
now located in Arizona, are one of two existing 
teams from the original eleven team Professional 
Football Association (1920), which becomes the 
NFL in 1922. The other existing team, the Decatur 
Staleys, moves to Chicago in 1921 and becomes the 
Chicago Bears in 1922. The Chicago Cardinals won 
NFL Championships in 1925 and 1947.27 In 1947, 
after the death of Charles Bidwill, Sr., his wife, 
Violet Bidwill becomes the first NFL female team 
owner, eventually marrying Walter Wolfner, who 
becomes team managing director, in 1949. In 1951, 
Charles Stormy Bidwill becomes team president, 
and William (Bill) Bidwill becomes team vice-
president.28 However, after a trend of disappointing 
                                                          
25 Ozanian, “The Most Valuable Teams in the NFL.” 
26 Greg Marecek, The St. Louis Football Cardinals: A 
Celebration of the Big Red (St. Louis, MO: Reedy Press, 2009), 
8. 
27 Ibid., 3-7. 
28 Ibid., 20-21. 
seasons and attendance, Greg Marecek, sportswriter, 
states,  
 
In the 1959 season, the Cards weren’t drawing 
in Chicago, so they moved home games to both 
Minnesota and to Solider Field in Chicago as 
they looked for a new home. The team lost their 
last six games, after which Violet Bidwill 
decided to pull up the trucks and move the 
franchise to St. Louis, where they had some 
success in annual charity preseason games.29 
 
In 1960, after the NFL team owners approve the 
relocation, the St. Louis Cardinals play their 
inaugural season. However, before the approval, St. 
Louis is separately courted as both a possible NFL 
expansion city and as a rival American Football 
League (AFL) city. Ultimately, both the AFL threat 
and the preference to have only one Chicago NFL 
team results in the relocation.30 On the Cardinals 
relocation to St. Louis, Marecek asserts, 
 
St. Louis fans were excited to have a football 
team, but while the Baseball Cardinals 
welcomed the new team to the city, the problem 
that would never really be resolved in twenty-
eight seasons quickly became apparent. There 
was one stadium and two teams, and the 
baseball team owned it. The Football Cardinals 
would have to schedule early season games on 
the road, they couldn’t practice on the field until 
baseball ended, and old Sportsman Park, a.k.a. 
Busch Stadium, had a fair number of seats with 
obstructed views. Another issue was that the 
Football Cardinals needed to be differentiated 
from the Baseball Cardinals. The football team 
was tagged with the moniker “the Big Red,” 
which became a catch phrase for fans, players, 
and broadcasters alike.31 
 
In the mid-1980s, the Cardinals threaten to leave St. 
Louis unless the city builds the team a new team 
stadium with increased seating capacity, specifically 
for usage by the Football Cardinals and not the 
Baseball Cardinals. In 1987, while Busch Stadium 
seating capacity, 54,392, is an NFL low, the 
                                                          
29 Ibid., 8. 
30 Ibid., 13. 
31 Ibid. 
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Baseball Cardinals average attendance (81 games) is 
still higher than the Football Cardinals average 
attendance (eight games).32 During political wars on 
the possible location of the St. Louis stadium, the 
Cardinals owner, William Bidwill, rejects a proposal 
for a 70,500 seat open air stadium in St. Louis 
County.33 Then, in early 1988, through the 
negotiations of Gov. John Ashcroft with St. Louis 
County Executive Gene McNary and St. Louis 
Mayor Vincent Schoemehl, St. Louis promises the 
support of downtown stadium construction. The 
Missouri General Assembly gives preliminary 
approval for a tax supported 70,000 seat stadium 
through a new stadium authority. However, after 
already courting offers from Baltimore and 
Jacksonville, William Bidwell files for relocation to 
Phoenix with the NFL.34 The new lease with the 
73,000 seat Sun Devil Stadium, at Arizona 
University, requires the Cardinals to locate in the 
area for a minimum of 10 years, with a team option 
up to 30 years, but the team can leave the lease for 
new stadium in the Phoenix area. Luxury boxes 
would yield about $2.5 million yearly.35 Projections 
also include $17 million annually in ticket and 
concession incentives.36 
On March 15, 1988, the day of the NFL owners 
vote, to combat the offer of Arizona, a local St. 
Louis civic group makes a last attempt at keeping the 
Rams through promises of increasing seating 
capacity in Busch Stadium until a new dome stadium 
is built. However, after 28 seasons in St. Louis, with 
only three playoff game appearances—all on the 
road and all losses—the NFL owners reluctantly but 
overwhelmingly approve (26 to 2) the Cardinals’ 
move to Arizona, becoming the Phoenix Cardinals 
                                                          
32 Don Pierson, “Cardinals Head for Phoenix,” Chicago 
Tribune, January 16, 1988, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1988-01-
16/sports/8803220953_1_william-bidwill-move-billy-bidwill. 
33 Associated Press, “The Cardinals Seek Approval for Phoenix 
Move,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 1988, accessed 
September 5, 2016, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-01-
16/sports/sp-9366_1_cardinals-move. 
34 Pierson, “Cardinals Head for Phoenix.” 
35 Gerald Eskenazi, “N.F.L. Approves Team Shift,” New York 
Times, March 16, 1988, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/16/sports/nfl-approves-team-
shift.html. 
36 Pierson, “Cardinals Head for Phoenix.” 
and later (1994) the Arizona Cardinals.37 On the 
Cardinals relocation to Arizona, Marecek claims, 
What “Mr. B” was absolute on was his loyalty 
to his team, his respect for the tradition of the 
NFL and his Cardinals, for the bird on the 
helmet, and the quality of the game. He was 
roasted for leaving St. Louis, yet had the 
stadium that was built for the Los Angeles Rams 
been promised, the Cardinals still would be in 
St. Louis today. His request and requirement of 
new digs was the norm and still is in the NFL.38 
 
The Rams (1995-2015) 
After the departure of the Cardinals, who would 
have stayed for a $90 million public subsidy,39 St. 
Louis attempts to secure one of the two 1993 NFL 
expansion teams, but, primarily due to issues 
establishing a viable local ownership group, St. 
Louis is not awarded an expansion team, but 
Charlotte and Jacksonville are.40 First, in order to 
attract an NFL team, St. Louis decides to build a 
new stadium, the Trans World Dome—later renamed 
the Edward Jones Dome. The dome is part of the 
Cervantes Convention Center to provide additional 
exhibition space for attracting premier 
conventions,41 and utilizes the St. Louis Regional 
Convention and Sports Complex Authority 
(STLRSA).42 On its creation and purpose to the 
dome, STLRSA states,  
 
                                                          
37 Eskenazi, “N.F.L. Approves Team Shift.” 
38 Marecek, The St. Louis Football Cardinals: A Celebration of 
the Big Red, 23. 
39 Mark S. Rosentraub, Major League Losers: The Real Cost of 
Sports and Who’s Paying For It—What Governments and 
Taxpayers Need to Know, Revised and Updated ed. (New 
York, NY: Basic Books, 1999), 249. 
40 Ibid., 66. 
41 Kristen E. Knauf, “If You Build It, Will They Stay? An 
Examination of State-of-the-Art Clauses in NFL Stadium 
Leases,” Marquette Sports Law Review 20, no. 2 (Spring 
2010): 482, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl
e=1488&context=sportslaw. 
42 St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex 
Authority, STLRSA 2015 Annual Report, by Brian McMurtry, 
(St. Louis, 2016), 1, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://stlrsa.org/2015%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
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The Authority was established by enabling State 
legislation in May 1989 as an independent 
public entity with 11 Commissioners. These 
Commissioners are appointed by the State of 
Missouri (5), the City of St. Louis (3), and St. 
Louis County (3) on a bipartisan basis. The 
Authority was established under Mo. Revised 
Statutes 67.650 to 67.658 and is empowered to 
acquire, purchase or lease, and construct sports 
stadiums and do all things incidental and 
necessary to facilitate these purposes. This 
authority was used to construct what is now the 
Edward Jones Dome. In connection with these 
activities, the Authority is granted all rights and 
powers necessary to plan, finance, construct, 
equip and maintain the Facility at the highest 
standards.43 
 
As result, STLRSA issues $258 million in 30-year 
revenue bonds with payment split 50% Missouri 
($12 million yearly), 25% St. Louis County ($6 
million yearly), and 25% St. Louis City ($6 million 
yearly). Included in the yearly amounts, the State 
pays $2 million in maintenance with the City and 
County paying $1 million each in maintenance. The 
total costs of the bonds are $720 million (State - 
$360 million, County - $180 million and City - $180 
million).44 Expanding on the scope of the public 
funding and financing, Neil deMause, journalist, and 
Joanna Cagan, teacher and writer, proclaim,  
 
The TWA Dome was constructed entirely at 
government expense, with $301 million raised 
by selling general purpose bonds. That $301 
million, plus interest, will be paid back at $24 
million a year over thirty years; a boost in the 
county hotel tax will pay for about a quarter of 
the sum, and the rest will be paid out of the 
general city and state treasuries. The 113 luxury 
boxes and sixty five hundred club seats will 
generate $1.8 million per year in tax subsidies 
via the business-entertainment deduction, paid 
for by the federal treasury. U.S. taxpayers will 
likewise be responsible for an additional $6 
million a year in subsidies through the federal-
tax exemption of the bonds. Trans World 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 
44 Fred W. Lindecke, “Razing to Start Action on Stadium,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, January 25, 1992. 
Airlines agreed to pay $1.3 million a year (plus 
inflation) to plaster its name on the dome, nearly 
a million of which will go to the Rams. Total 
subsidy: $1.07 billion over thirty years.45 
 
Second, in order to secure a NFL team, St. Louis 
engages with the Los Angeles Rams. In 1946, the 
Rams and their owner, Dan Reeves, relocate to Los 
Angeles from their NFL founding city—Cleveland 
(1937). In 1972, after the death of Reeves, Robert 
Irsay buys the Rams from Reeve’s estate. Then, he 
trades ownership with Baltimore Colts owner, 
Carroll Rosenbloom. In 1979, Rosenbloom drowns 
and his wife, Georgia Frontiere, becomes Rams 
owner and the second NFL female team owner. 
Frontiere fires her stepson, Steve Rosenbloom (the 
team operations manager).46 Rosenbloom contends 
his father only gives Frontiere control of the team 
due to the widow tax exemption but does not intend 
for her to actually run the team.47 In 1980, the Rams 
leave the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (opened 
1923) to play in the newer (opened 1966) football 
retrofitted Anaheim Stadium, home of the California 
Angels (MLB).48 Further, in 1982, the Raiders move 
from Oakland to Los Angeles, playing in the Los 
Angeles Memorial Coliseum.49 However, the Rams 
still sought a newer stadium with more modern 
revenue sources.  As a result, when Los Angeles, 
Anaheim, and Orange County respond unfavorably 
to new stadium demands, the Rams look to St. 
Louis.50 In securing the relocation of the Rams, 
Mark Rosentraub, Professor of Sports Management 
and Director of the Center for Sport and Policy at 
University of Michigan, writes,  
 
                                                          
45 Neil deMause and Joanna Cagan, Field of Schemes: How the 
Great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money into Private Profit, 
Revised and Expanded ed. (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2008), 60. 
46 Jim Peltz, “Socialite Moves Rams to St. Louis,” Los Angeles 
Times, January 19, 2008, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/19/local/me-frontiere19. 
47 Chad Garrison, “Georgia’s Playbook,” St. Louis Business 
Journal, January 26, 2003, accessed September 5, 2016, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/2003/01/27/story2.h
tml. 
48 Knauf, “If You Build It, Will They Stay?” 483. 
49 Eskenazi, “N.F.L. Approves Team Shift.” 
50 Knauf, “If You Build It, Will They Stay? An Examination of 
State-of-the-Art Clauses in NFL Stadium Leases,” 483. 
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To entice the Rams from Anaheim, the city and 
county of St. Louis offered the team a 
wonderful lease for use of their new dome. The 
St. Louis Rams would receive 100 percent of all 
concession revenues, 75 percent of advertising 
income from the facility, and 90 percent in any 
year that more than $6 million in advertising 
income was earned. A local corporate group 
guaranteed that 85 percent of the luxury boxes 
and club seats would be sold for fifteen years 
and the Rams could keep all of this income. 
Through the sale of seat options to prospective 
fans, the city and county of St. Louis also 
agreed to provide the funds to pay the team’s 
indemnity to Anaheim, all moving expenses, 
and the costs associated with building a practice 
facility. The Rams received twelve hundred 
parking spots for each game at the cost of $2 per 
spot as well, and could distribute or sell these as 
they desired. For all these incentives or 
provisions, the Rams pay an annual rent of 
$250,000 and between $250,000 and $300,000 
for game day expenses associated with the use 
of the facility. There is the potential for the 
Rams to ‘cover’ the annual cost of their lease 
from the advertising they sell in the stadium 
built for them with taxpayer’ funds.51 
 
On January 17, 1995, Georgia Frontiere, originally 
from St. Louis, announces the relocation of the 
Rams to St. Louis, but NFL team owners decidedly 
block the move. However, after litigation threats by 
both the Rams and Missouri Attorney General Jay 
Nixon, on April 12, 1995, the NFL team owners 
approve (23-6-1) Rams relocation to St. Louis,52 the 
same year the Los Angeles Raiders also move back 
to Oakland.53 In setting new standards for public 
sports subsidies, St. Louis got a NFL team, and the 
NFL team got record profits.54 On the Rams 
relocation to St. Louis, Frontiere exclaims, “St. 
Louis is my hometown, and I brought my team here 
to start a new dynasty. In my early days, I thought 
I’d become a big opera star in Europe. Now, by 
                                                          
51 Rosentraub, Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports 
and Who’s Paying For It, 66-67. 
52 Knauf, “If You Build It, Will They Stay?” 483. 
53 Peltz, “Socialite Moves Rams to St. Louis.” 
54 Rosentraub, Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports 
and Who’s Paying For It, 215. 
bringing the city an NFL team, I’m doing something 
that truly will make St. Louis proud. I’ve worked 
hard for it.”55 
 
Before the start of 1995-1996 season, the Rams 
make the move to the Trans World Dome in the new 
St. Louis Convention and Visitor Center (CVC). St. 
Louis commits to the CVC before the Rams, 
including building the dome during Rams 
negotiations. During negotiations, the CVC agrees to 
a Rams relocation fee to be paid to the NFL. Upon 
agreeing to the relocation, the Rams agree not to sue 
the League. However, instead, the CVC sues the 
NFL and all member teams, except the Rams, 
primarily relative to antitrust claims and the 
relocation fee.56 
 
After the disappointing 1995-1996 St. Louis Rams 
season of seven wins and nine losses, the CVC files 
a $130 million lawsuit against the NFL, with 
damages tripled if won, including the following 
claims. One, a Sherman Act Section 1 conspiracy 
claim alleges the NFL Guidelines and Relocation 
Policies are illegal and promote collusive action. 
Two, a Section 2 monopolization claim alleges the 
NFL used its power to gain illegal profits. Three, a 
tortious interference claim alleges the NFL 
wrongfully denied business advantage to deal with 
all NFL teams. However, the judge dismisses the 
case and finds in favor of the NFL, which is affirmed 
by the Eight District Court in 1998.57 Relative to the 
CVC case, Franklin Fisher, Professor of Economics 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 
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Christopher Maxwell, Vice President at Charles 
River Associates, and Evan Sue Schouten, Principal 
at Charles River Associates, contend, 
 
The St. Louis CVC claimed that the NFL 
relocation policies had caused the city to receive 
‘firesale’ lease terms for its stadium or, 
equivalently, that the NFL’s relocation policies 
had caused the city to greatly ‘overpay’ to get 
the Rams. The CVC believed that these policies 
had prevented all of the other teams from 
negotiating with St. Louis. This belief had little 
factual basis, since the CVC failed to contact 
any other team beside the Rams regarding 
leasing its stadium. It seems more likely, 
however, that, to the extent that the CVC’s lease 
terms were unfavorable, it was because the city, 
itself, had placed itself in a poor bargaining 
position by committing to build a stadium prior 
to arranging for an NFL tenant.58 
 
In the Rams lease, an “escape hatch” exists.  The 
lease gives the Rams the ability to move if the dome 
is not in the top 25% of NFL stadiums, including 
specific components being first tier, on March 1, 
2005, or March 1, 2015. The 30-year lease then 
becomes a one-year lease. This clause implies 
continuous additional public funding is needed to 
meet compliance.59 Further, at least 15 components 
must be first tier with very little, if any, guidance on 
what that status means, resulting in the CVC 
eventually creating a $4 million yearly preservation 
fund to attempt clause compliance and 
maintenance.60 Relative to the lease of the dome to 
the Rams, the STLRSA states, 
 
The St. Louis Rams Football Partnership 
(“RAMS”), owner of the St. Louis Rams NFL 
football team, has certain rights to occupy and 
use the Dome through March 31, 2025 under an 
Amended and Restated St. Louis NFL Lease 
dated January 17, 1995 (the “Lease”) among the 
RAMS, the CVC and St. Louis NFL 
Corporation (“SLNFL”). Pursuant to Annex 1 to 
the Lease dated January 17, 1995 among the 
                                                          
58 Fisher, Maxwell, Schouten, “Sports Facilities and 
Development: The Economics of Sports Leagues,” 198. 
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RAMS, the CVC, the Authority and SLNFL, the 
CVC and the Authority have agreed to (1) 
operate, manage, maintain and repair the Dome 
to a First Class Standard (as hereinafter defined) 
at all times during the term of the Lease and (2) 
cause the Dome to meet the First Tier Standard 
(as hereinafter defined) on July 31, 2005 and 
March 1, 2015. “First Class Standard” means 
that the Dome and each component thereof is to 
be constructed, operated, maintained and 
repaired to a first class, superior or excellent 
standard. “First Tier Standard” means that the 
Dome and each component thereof must be 
among the top 25% of all NFL football stadia 
and NFL football facilities, if such NFL football 
stadiums and facilities were to be rated or 
ranked according to the matter sought to be 
measured. If the Dome is not maintained to a 
First Class Standard for 60 days following 
written notice by the RAMS to the CVC (or 5 
days during the NFL season), the RAMS must 
first attempt to remedy such condition and offset 
the cost thereof against any obligation it has to 
the CVC under the Lease, and thereafter may 
terminate the Lease or convert the Lease to an 
annual term with the RAMS having successive 
unilateral annual renewal options thereafter until 
March 31, 2025. If the Dome does not meet the 
First Tier Standard on July 31, 2005 and again 
on March 1, 2015, the RAMS may by written 
notice to the CVC convert the Lease to an 
annual term with the RAMS having successive 
unilateral renewal options thereafter until March 
31, 2025.61 
 
To attempt to comply with the first tier/standard 
clause for 2005, the CVC and Rams agree to the 
improvements of four elements: suite and suite 
concourses, club suites, lounges and concourses, 
lightning and sound, and the playing field. As a 
result, the playing field is temporarily installed for 
four years until a new removable turf is agreed upon 
for 2010. Further, in the fall of 2007, the two parties 
cannot agree on what first-tier status is, so a second 
amendment to the lease commits the CVC, Regional 
Sports Authority (RSA) and Rams to $30 million in 
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Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority, accessed 
September 5, 2016, http://stlrsa.org/the-edward-jones-
dome.html. 
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renovations by 2009. The 13 dome improvements 
include two end zone video boards.62 Further, based 
upon this lease precedence, other NFL teams with a 
similar clause include: Cincinnati Bangals, Kansas 
City Chiefs, and San Diego Chargers.63 However, 
Kristen Knauf, JD, of University of Marquette Law 
School, argues these clauses are unconscionable and 
should therefore be unenforceable in contract law,64 
warning in 2010,  
 
In some sense, St. Louis’s situation could be 
seen as a lesson in contract drafting for other 
communities and their professional sports 
franchises. However, St. Louis’s agreement to 
include the state-of-the-art clause in the lease 
should not be construed as giving any kind of 
legitimacy to such clauses. Franchise relocation 
has historically been one of the biggest 
problems that the NFL has had to face. The 
victims of franchise relocations are the fans, 
cities, taxpayers, and, ultimately, the league 
itself. Although there have not been any recent 
NFL franchise movements, only time will tell if 
state-of-the art clauses are the sparks that ignite 
a new fire of NFL franchise movement.65 
 
In January 2008, after a St. Louis Rams Super Bowl 
Championship in 1999, Georgia Frontiere dies, and 
her children, Chip Rosenbloom and Lucia 
Rodriguez, inherit her 60% Rams ownership, plus 
the inheritance tax. In July 2008, the children hire a 
firm to handle team ownership offers. In late May 
2009, the children hire Goldman Sachs for bid 
evaluation and buyer solicitation. In early June 2009, 
the St. Louis Blues (NHL) owner, Dave Checketts, 
makes official his desire to group purchase the 
Rams. In October 2009, Rush Limbaugh, political 
commentator (born in Cape Girardeau, MO) decides 
to join the Checketts group, but at least a half dozen 
potential buyers exist at this point. By mid-October, 
                                                          
62 St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission, Edward 
Jones Dome and the St. Louis Rams - Confidential-, (February 
2012): 1-2, accessed September 5, 2016, 
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64 Ibid., 493. 
65 Ibid., 495. 
after opposition, Checketts removes Limbaugh from 
his group. By mid-January 2010, Frontiere’s 
children narrow to three potential buyers. At the end 
of January 2010, the Checketts group adds Gerald J. 
Ford, Texas billionaire, as its lead investor at 30%. 
By early February 2010, NFL Commissioner 
Goodell prefers St. Louis stay an NFL city for the 
foreseeable future. By mid-January 2010, Shahid 
Khan, Illinois auto parts manufacturer, has an 
agreement with the Frontiere children for their 60% 
ownership. However, in mid-April 2010, 40% Rams 
minority owner, Stan Kroenke, uses his right to first 
refusal to purchase the team, claiming he will 
attempt to keep the Rams in St. Louis. By late May 
2010, Kroenke presents his Rams purchase plans to 
the NFL Finance Committee, including how he will 
meet the NFL cross-ownership guidelines relative to 
his ownership of the Denver Nuggets (NBA) and 
Colorado Avalanche (NHL). In mid-August 2010, 
Goodell notifies NFL owners of the unanimous 
recommendation of Kroenke by the finance 
committee. On August 25, 2010, Kroenke is 
unanimously approved as the new Rams owner.66 
Moreover, on the new Kroenke Rams ownership, 
Chip Rosenbloom declares,  
 
Fifteen years ago, my family entered a 
partnership with Stan Kroenke and it has been a 
wonderful relationship. Although today is an 
emotional day and the end of an era for our 
family, it is also the beginning of a new chapter 
in the rich history of the St. Louis Rams. We 
look forward to Stan continuing the great 
tradition of the organization. On behalf of my 
sister Lucia (Rodriguez) and our entire family, 
we congratulate Stan and the Kroenke family on 
becoming the majority owner of the Rams.67 
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In 1995, after being involved in the 1993 expansion 
process as a lead investor,68 during the possible 
relocation of the Rams, Stan Kroenke could buy up 
to 40% of the Rams, and, as minority owner, had the 
option of either leaving the Rams in Anaheim or 
moving them to St. Louis. However, he chooses to 
move them to St. Louis to increase short term profit 
yields, especially relative to the dome.69 In 1995, 
Kroenke pays $60 million for a 30% Rams 
ownership. Then, in 1998, he pays $20 million for 
another 10% Rams ownership, totaling $80 million 
spent and 40% ownership obtained.70 Finally, in 
2010, Kroenke, the Columbia, MO, billionaire, pays 
$450 million for the remaining 60% of the Rams 
ownership, which is based upon the team valuation 
of $750 million (60% equals $450 million).71 On his 
new ownership of the Rams, Kroenke states,  
 
I’m going to attempt to do everything that I can 
to keep the Rams in St. Louis. Just as I did 
everything that I could to bring the team to St. 
Louis in 1995. I believe my actions speak for 
themselves. There’s a track record. I’ve always 
stepped up for pro football in St. Louis. And I’m 
stepping up one more time. I’m born and raised 
in Missouri. I’ve been a Missourian for 60 
years. People in our state know me. People 
know I can be trusted. People know I am an 
honorable guy.72 
 
By February 1, 2012, the St. Louis Convention and 
Visitors Commission (CVC) provides a preliminary 
compliancy plan to the Rams for the March 1, 2015, 
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first tier deadline.73 The CVC plan includes 
improvements to all 15 first tier components, 
featuring: a 50,000-square-foot club and suit 
entrance in Baer Plaza that connects the Dome to 
Broadway, conversion of the courtyard between the 
convention center and the Dome into a pre-game fan 
destination, new graphics and lighting throughout 
the Dome and a massive center scoreboard.74 
Relative to funding these improvements and the 
amended lease limitation to first-tier items generally 
provided by the NFL franchisee, the CVC argues,  
 
This language limits CVC’s obligation for new 
construction or renovations to the extent the 
items included in those improvements are 
generally paid for by the NFL franchisee in 
other stadia. CVC has researched the 
franchisees’ contributions to the new stadia built 
and/or stadia significantly renovated since the 
last measuring date in 2005. This data indicates 
that NFL franchisees have been solely 
responsible for generally providing (on average) 
fifty-two percent (52%) of the costs and expense 
of the items included in these stadia projects. 
Therefore, CVC is only obligated under the 
Amended Lease to undertake and/or provide 
funding for forty-eight (48%) of the 
improvements in the first-tier proposal that 
follows.75 
 
As a result, since the CVC preliminary proposal 
improvements total $124 million, the Rams would 
be responsible for $64.48 million (52%) and the 
CVC responsible for $59.52 million (48%).76 The 
Rams must notify the CVC on plan approval by 
March 1, 2012.77 
 
On March 1, 2012, the Rams reject the CVC 
proposal and submit a counter proposal created by 
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Number 4 (Fall/Winter 2016-2017) | Missouri Policy Journal | 35 
 
 
HKS Sports and Entertainment, architects. Rams 
propose substantial Dome improvements through the 
facility seating bowl, patron amenities and support, 
NFL and multipurpose facilities, convention 
facilities, food service, facility operations, 
media/electronic systems, mechanical and electrical, 
circulation, miscellaneous (entry drive-up/drop-off, 
trash chutes, catwalk, and perimeter security), and 
future (“Super Bowl” seating expansion and future 
suites).78,79 In order to price the improvements 
proposed by the Rams, the CVC hires a construction 
firm, which estimates the construction costs at $700 
million plus a $500 million loss on conventions 
during the estimated three-year renovations.80 
Ultimately, the CVC and Rams cannot negotiate an 
agreement on the first tier standard, resulting in a 
lease default arbitration panel on June 15, 2012.81 
Regarding the arbitration panel findings, the CVC 
shares, 
 
The CVC and the RAMS have engaged in 
arbitration regarding the improvements 
necessary to ensure the Dome meets the First 
Tier Standard on March 1, 2015. The RAMS 
sought a series of improvements estimated to 
cost approximately $800 million to $900 
million. In February 2013, an arbitration panel 
held in favor of the RAMS. The arbitration 
panel found that, due to several structural 
deficiencies in the size and dimensions of the 
Dome (compared to other, newer NFL 
stadiums), only the improvements suggested by 
the RAMS will meet the First Tier Standard 
required by the Lease.82 
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In addition, per the ruling, the CVC is also 
responsible for the Ram’s $2,013,150 arbitration 
fees.83 Further, after the ruling, the CVC announces, 
“In July 2013, the CVC announced that it will not 
commence the improvements proposed by the 
RAMS and discussed in the arbitration panel’s 
decision. Accordingly, beginning in March 2015, the 
Lease may be converted to an annual term with the 
RAMS having successive unilateral renewal options 
thereafter as discussed above.”84 
 
In late December 2014, the St. Louis Rams, San 
Diego Chargers, and the Oakland Raiders, each with 
leases allowing the team to vacate, inform the NFL 
that they will not move to Los Angeles and remain 
in their current cities in 2015.85 As a result, Missouri 
Gov. Jay Nixon believes the St. Louis Rams will 
stay through a stadium plan led by his two-man task 
force.86 The task force includes Dave Peacock, a 
former President of Anheuser-Busch, working with 
the NFL on advertising and marketing, and also a 
Pro Football Hall of Fame advisory board member 
and past-chairman of the St. Louis Sports 
Commission. The second member is Robert Blitz, a 
founding attorney at Blitz, Bardgett and Deutsch in 
St. Louis, who also helped relocate the Rams to St. 
Louis and is a former member of and current legal 
counsel to the St. Louis Regional Convention and 
Sports Complex Authority.87 However, in any 
stadium plan, Governor Nixon expects to see six 
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core principles. One, the project uses land that is 
currently in a blighted location and not scheduled for 
redevelopment. Two, the land needs to be certified 
for environmental clean-up. Three, construction 
creates jobs with competitive wages and tries to 
utilize materials nearby. Four, the project 
incorporates a plan to continue to utilize the Edward 
Jones Dome. Five, the stadium is a public asset, not 
private. Six, the project creates no new tax burden on 
citizens in the local region or state, including no new 
tax increase proposals requiring a vote.88 Moreover, 
in regards to keeping the Rams, Governor Nixon 
declares,  
 
Being an NFL city is a matter of civic and state 
pride, and make no mistake about it—St. Louis 
is an NFL city. The economic impact of having 
an NFL team in St. Louis extends long beyond 
Sunday afternoon, and sends a clear signal that 
this city is a worldwide player. I am confident 
that these two outstanding civic leaders can 
explore paths forward that will protect taxpayers 
and ensure private investment.89 
 
On January 5, 2015, Stockbridge Capital Group, 
owners of a 298-acre Hollywood Park site in 
Englewood, California, announces a partnership 
between them and Stan Kroenke, Rams Owner, to 
build a new NFL stadium for Los Angeles.90 
Kroenke recently purchased the 60 acres adjacent to 
Hollywood Park and the Forum, previous home of 
the Los Angeles Lakers (NBA) and Los Angeles 
Kings (NHL) and now renovated music venue. Wal-
Mart sold Kroenke the land after not receiving 
public approval to build a superstore. Kroenke is a 
former Wal-Mart board member and husband to 
Anne Walton Kroenke, daughter of Wal-Mart co-
founder Bud Walton.91  Further, the stadium is part 
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of a larger development project plan (City of 
Champions Revitalization Project) that does not use 
tax dollars, but includes an 80,000 seat stadium with 
a 6,000 seat performance venue and a reconfigured 
previously approved Hollywood Park Plan of 
890,000 square feet of retail space, 780,000 square 
feet of office space, 2,500 residential units, 300 hotel 
rooms, and 25 acres of public space.92 
 
On January 9, 2015, Peacock and Blitz announce a 
downtown open-air north riverfront stadium, seating 
64,000. Above the high-mark of the Mississippi 
River, the 90-acre stadium project includes a floating 
riverfront trail, boat docks, and 10,000 parking 
spaces. The $860 to $985 million cost projections 
include $200 million from the NFL loan program, 
$250 million from Stan Kroenke, $55 million in 
state tax credits, $130 million in personal seat 
licenses (PSLs) to fans, and $350 million from bond 
extensions on the Edward Jones Dome.93 St. Louis 
City owns 22.5 acres out of the total 90 acres (25%), 
which includes 33 buildings, mostly vacant, and the 
preserved 1902 Power and Light Building.94 In 
response to the St. Louis stadium announcement, in 
an open letter from Hartford to St. Louis, Dan Haar, 
Hartford Courant reporter and columnist, writes, 
 
Don’t Do it! . . . Yes, the glitzy renderings look 
like a salvation, where empty lots and crumbling 
buildings now stand. But it’s not a touchdown. 
It’s a fool’s goal chasing an NFL owner who 
doesn’t want to be there, building on land that 
could someday redefine St. Louis. . . . But the 
risk of spending taxpayer dollars on a new 
stadium is hardly the main reason for this 
warning. The bigger matter is the feel of the city 
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itself, and that’s where we in Hartford can help 
our friends in the Show-Me State. Hartford and 
St. Louis share a lot—river towns built on 
manufacturing, both with a claim to Mark 
Twain, both living in the shadow of larger 
neighbors, both with priceless historic assets, 
both fighting to keep our downtown districts 
lively. Sure, you’re more than twice our size 
now, far more of a national city, not to mention 
a National League city. But that’s the point. 
Way back when, Hartford was the Silicon 
Valley of America, home of the leading 
factories, birthplace of your beloved baseball 
National League. . . . In the middle of the 
Clinton boom, we lost the big-league hockey 
team whose arena had displaced old city blocks. 
We invented a “landing” of our own, named 
Adriaen’s, in the hopes that it would be like 
your Laclede’s. We even waved $374 million in 
the face of an NFL owner, offering a downtown, 
riverfront stadium—a deal hailed with a 
‘Touchdown!’ headline in our newspaper—only 
to find ourselves mocked again. That spurning 
by Patriots’ owner Bob Kraft was a good thing. 
We built a college football stadium across the 
river. We’re restocking downtown with smaller 
companies, arts and culture, and, mostly, new 
apartments in old buildings. Slowly, it’s 
working. You’re way ahead of us, St. Louis. 
You have the critical mass. You have the Arch. 
You have the Cardinals and the Blues. You 
already have a football dome downtown, just 20 
years old and now apparently worthless. Don’t 
build another one on your last great stretch of 
riverfront for just eight big games a year. Those 
crumbling industrial buildings on the site—the 
collection, not just the best one—could form the 
core of a lively, waterfront district, 365 days a 
year.95 
 
On January 26, 2015, the Rams send the St. Louis 
Convention and Visitors Commission (CVC) official 
notice of their lease conversion to annual tenancy, 
which begins April 1, 2015, and ends March 31, 
                                                          
95 Dan Haar, “An Open Letter From Hartford to St. Louis: 
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accessed September 5, 2016, 
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2016.96 As a result, the chairman of the CVC, 
Andrew Leonard, believes only a “spectacular 
effort” will keep the Rams since they would rather 
be in LA.97 
 
In late February 2015, the San Diego Chargers and 
Oakland Raiders propose a joint $1.7 billion stadium 
on 168 acres in Carson, California. Even though 
each team continues to pursue public subsidies and a 
new stadium in their home markets, the privately 
financed LA joint venture serves as a back-up plan. 
The New York Jets and New York Giants are the 
only teams that currently play in the same stadium, 
MetLife Stadium, which is part of the Meadowlands 
Sports Complex in East Rutherford, New Jersey. 
While the Chargers and Raiders have been seeking 
stadium subsidy solutions for 14 years and six years 
respectively, the LA market presents a unique 
private stadium opportunity with its massive revenue 
potential and ability to increase the value of a 
franchise substantially. Moreover, like the Rams and 
Raiders, the Chargers previously located in LA and 
played at the Memorial Coliseum as the Los Angeles 
Chargers, but only for their inaugural season in the 
American Football League (AFL) in 1960 before 
relocating to San Diego in 1961.98 
 
In early April 2015, Governor Nixon decides to 
eliminate St. Louis County taxpayers from the new 
NFL stadium financing plan, removing their $6 
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million a year contribution. Regardless, St. Louis 
County Executive, Steve Stenger, would only 
support county tax dollars through a public vote 
anyway. Further, opponents of public stadium 
funding continue to argue against the stadium plan 
based upon existing laws in both the county and the 
city.99  
 
In May 2001, Fred Lindecke, retired political 
reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and 
Jeannette Mott Oxford, grassroots coordinator and 
future State Representative (D-St. Louis City), form 
the Coalition Against Public Stadium Funding. The 
group encompasses members from all parties and 
backgrounds, united by their opposition against 
wasting public funding on assisting millionaires in 
building stadiums.100 As a result, on November 5, 
2002, a Coalition Against Public Funding for 
Stadiums referendum passes (55% to 45%), which 
affects all future professional sport facility public 
funding.101 Further, on November 2, 2004, the 
similar St. Louis County charter amendment, 
Proposition A, passes (72% to 28%).102 
 
On April 6, 2015, St. Louis University School of 
Law Professor and Attorney at Law, John J. 
Ammann, and three of his student attorneys, Zachary 
Merkle, Maria DeFer and Erica Mazzotti, send a 
demand letter to Mr. Winston Calvert, St. Louis City 
Counselor on behalf of their client, Mr. William 
White.103 Ammann demands, 
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We represent Mr. William White, a City 
resident and taxpayer. Mr. White likes the St. 
Louis Rams and enjoys football generally. 
However, as a formerly homeless individual, he 
wants to ensure that the City complies with its 
own City Code before it commits to using an 
enormous amount of public funding for the 
proposed Stadium Project on the North St. Louis 
riverfront, the project intended for use by an 
NFL team. . . . The City’s Code is nearly 
identical to the St. Louis County Charter 
provision, Section 11.160 through Section 
11.180. St. Louis County Executive Steve 
Stenger has stated that public spending on a new 
stadium would require a public hearing and a 
vote. Surely, the City would also need public 
hearing and vote before it could provide 
financial assistance to the stadium. . . . It would 
appear that the Stadium Project will not move 
forward without financial assistance from the 
City. The longer the City waits before 
complying with Section 3.91 of the City Code, 
the greater the urgency for Mr. White to bring 
legal action to ensure the City complies. If we 
do not receive a response from you that the City 
has begun compliance with Chapter. 3.91 by 
April 12, we will advise Mr. White to take all 
appropriate legal action. Thank you for your 
consideration, and we look forward to the fiscal 
note, public hearing, and public vote that will 
allow the community to decide the priorities it 
wants to fund.104 
 
In late May 2015, in response to the possible 
Raiders/Chargers dual Los Angeles NFL stadium, 
San Diego Mayor Kevin Faulconer and his stadium 
planning committee announce plans for a $1.1 
billion stadium that will not increase taxes. 
However, in this plan, the Chargers and the NFL are 
accountable for only $500 million total. The plan 
includes: $173 million in bonds, $121 million from 
San Diego, $121 million from San Diego County, 
$100 million from ticket surcharges and personal 
seat licenses, and a city contribution of $225 million 
from the projected development sale of the current 
Qualcomm Stadium site. The Chargers would pay $1 
million per game rent, so at least $8 million annually 
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in rent plus possible playoff game rent.105 Regarding 
the San Diego stadium proposal, Michael Hiltzik, 
Los Angeles Times Columnist, argues,  
 
San Diego has a right to be appalled. It doesn’t 
have a right to be surprised. This is how the 
NFL and its teams operate when they’re trying 
to get themselves a new stadium. To their 
incumbent cities, they dangle their interest in 
staying on a string; to wanna-be cities, they 
dangle their interest in relocating. The city of 
Carson, which is hoping to become the 
Chargers’ new home, should sign up for San 
Diego’s correspondence course in surviving the 
NFL. Oh, sure, the Chargers say their discontent 
with the San Diego offer stems from 
Faulconer’s plans to hold a city-only taxpayer 
vote despite the original financing proposal. 
(There are no plans for a vote by county 
taxpayers, who would be on the hook for at least 
$121 million.) . . . The fed-up civic leaders see 
this as mere pretext. They would be totally 
within their rights to conjecture that if the 
Chargers really wanted to stay in San Diego—
and if the taxpayers put up more money—they’d 
find a way to do so. The reality is that the 
Chargers have a free path to leaving San Diego. 
That’s the consequence of a sweetheart deal the 
community granted the team that has 
allowed them to break their lease without 
consequences every year since 2007. They’ve 
stayed, at considerable cost to San Diego, which 
has had to pay for the upkeep of Qualcomm 
Stadium. Unless you believe that the Chargers, 
who have appeared in one Super Bowl in their 
history (and lost), bring some glitter to San 
Diego that translates into economic gain, the 
Chargers have been a deadweight loss to the 
community. Indeed, given its existing drivers of 
economic growth, including tourism, high-tech 
industry and the military, San Diego is the very 
model of a place that doesn’t need the NFL. 
That hasn’t kept the team from swanking around 
as though San Diego might cease to exist 
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without it. The Chargers’ treatment of the 
community is nothing short of contemptuous.106 
 
In late June 2015, City Budget Director Paul Payne 
expresses serious concerns with the Rams tax 
revenues not covering existing stadium debt. He 
claims the $8.5 million raised annually through the 
St. Louis City hotel-motel tax does not cover 
existing stadium debt, but instead covers part of the 
$17.7 million annual debt of the south wing of the 
convention center. Further, Payne contends the 
Rams generate $4.2 million annually through ticket 
sales, payroll, concession, etc., which is only two-
thirds of the $6 million annually paid by the city on 
the stadium debt and maintenance. Overall, the two 
taxes dedicated to the convention center and stadium 
debt, 3.5% hotel tax and 1% restaurant tax, generate 
less than $15 million annually towards the combined 
$23.5 million debt payments. Moreover, he adds the 
current stadium actually prevents the city from 
securing conventions.107 
 
In early July 2015, NFL market data reveals St. 
Louis fans will generally support a new stadium, 
especially through a willingness to pay for new 
PSLs. The one-time seat licenses, required for 
annual season tickets, project revenue of $500 to 
$40,000 each, totaling $200 million towards the new 
stadium. However, the data also reveals NFL 
concerns. One, while fans and corporations initially 
supported the Rams after their move from Los 
Angeles through season ticket purchases, the season 
ticket purchases and support declined as the Rams 
continued to lose. Two, Rams average season ticket 
prices rank 22nd, 28th in average club seat price, and 
fourth-lowest in average annual attendance the last 
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five years. Three, the Rams are second in team 
popularity to the Cardinals.108 
 
In early August 2015, Missouri Circuit Court Judge 
Thomas Frawley declares the St. Louis City 
ordinance requiring a public vote invalid, while also 
finding the new proposed riverfront stadium be 
located “adjacent” to the convention center.109 In the 
34-page court ruling, Judge Thomas writes, 
  
It is clear the intent of the Ordinance is to 
provide the voters of the City of St. Louis with 
authority to approve the City’s financial 
assistance to development of a new professional 
sports facility. However, the fatal flaw in the 
Ordinance is not in what it says but in what it 
doesn’t say. Therefore, to render the Ordinance 
valid, the Court must add to, not strike from, the 
Ordinance to cure its vagueness. 
Notwithstanding the severability clause of the 
Ordinance, the Court is not justified in 
‘rewriting the Ordinance’ even if the Court 
somehow could be sure that this is what the 
legislature would have done.110 
 
Further, while St. Louis City public officials, 
especially the mayor’s office, consider the options 
relative to still conducting a public vote on the 
stadium funding,111 Fred Lindecke, Coalition 
Against Public Stadium Funding co-founder, 
advocates,  
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The people voted. And now the judge has said 
forget all that. It makes me angry. The law is as 
clear and straightforward as you can get. It 
covers every kind of technique known to man 
for getting into the taxpayer’s pocket. And it 
says very clearly, without ambiguity, that people 
have a right to vote before any of their tax 
money is used to build a stadium. I would hope 
that someone in city government would be as 
upset as I am, and would try to do something 
about it.112 
 
In mid-August 2015, the Missouri Development 
Finance Board (MDFB) approves $15 million in 
state tax credits for the new NFL stadium, which 
would increase to $50 million over three years.113 At 
this point, Mayor Francis Slay contends a St. Louis 
City public vote is not needed relative to stadium 
public funding nor will he call for one, especially 
after a judge invalidates the St. Louis City 
ordinance.114 Relative to keeping the Rams, Mayor 
Slay conveys, 
 
Having an NFL team in a city is really, I think, a 
huge amenity. It’s one of the things that make 
living in a big city fun. I’m not going to sit here 
and say that we can prove that money going into 
this—that we’re going to get out, in dollars and 
cents, what we’re putting into it. But I do think 
it’s a good investment in the city and its future. 
People like NFL football. They want a team that 
they can support, whether they go to the games 
or not. It has a lot to do with big-city pride. We 
need leadership. And I believe very strongly that 
people want a football team. I think it’s time to 
step up, take a position, and lead. And that’s 
what I’m doing.115 
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In early September 2015, longtime St. Louisans Dan 
Dierdorf and Joe Buck continue to vent their 
frustration with the ongoing Rams saga, particularly 
with Stan Kroenke.116 Dierdorf is a St. Louis 
Cardinals Football Hall of Famer, former NFL 
broadcaster117, and former CVC Chairman.118 Buck 
is a lead NFL broadcaster, MLB broadcaster, and 
son of legendary baseball announcer and St. Louis 
Cardinals Hall of Famer, Jack Buck.119 Relative to 
the Rams staying in St. Louis, Buck declares,  
 
I think it’s also the team’s responsibility. And 
this team has been terrible. It’s always a new 
year with the same result. I think that’s asking a 
lot of an average fan to get excited about going 
to a game when they can sit at home and get it 
on high definition. . . . Your team has got to be 
competitive and dynamic. They don’t even have 
anyone they can put on a billboard right now. . . 
. There is not enough happening here, and to 
become a non-NFL city is frightening.120 
 
Dierdorf adds,  
I wish the Rams would have tried harder to be 
part of the community, and extended more of an 
effort over the years that they’ve been here, 
especially when we have an owner who won’t 
even talk to a city who gives him so much. And 
when you see a man like Kroenke whose net 
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worth is something like $15 billion, that’s a hard 
sell. Wouldn’t you love for Stan to say 
something? I like him, but I think he dropped 
the ball on this one. We deserve to be treated 
better than we have been treated.121 
 
In early October 2015, the new proposed stadium 
becomes National Car Rental Field. The 20-year 
naming rights deal is worth $7.9 million yearly, 
totaling $158 million.122 The Missouri Department 
of Economic Development (DED) also authorizes 
$43,279,563 in Brownfield Tax Credits, which are 
eligible to environmental improvement 
developments.123 At the same time, NFL owners 
approve Kroenke’s professional sports cross-
ownership, which maintains his Rams ownership 
and transfers both Denver Nuggets (NBA) and 
Colorado Avalanche (NHL) ownership to his wife, 
Anne Walton Kroenke. The NBA and NHL team 
operations become the responsibility of his son, Josh 
Kroenke.124 
On October 27, 2015, St. Louis Rams citizens, 
primarily fans, plead their case to NFL executives at 
a public hearing held at the Peabody Opera House. 
The same hearings occur in San Diego on October 
28, 2015, and in Oakland on October 29, 2015. NFL 
relocation guidelines, the same guidelines citizens 
question and express frustration with throughout the 
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public hearings, actually require the public 
hearings.125 
On November 11, 2015, in New York City, St. 
Louis, along with San Diego and Oakland, present 
their cases to the NFL’s Los Angeles, stadium and 
finance committees for keeping their teams and 
avoiding relocation to Los Angeles. Each team 
presentation lasts for 45 minutes plus question and 
answer. The St. Louis meeting lasts approximately 
two hours, which also includes St. Louis Rams 
officials. Kroenke does not ask the presenters any 
questions.126 Relative to the presentation, presenter 
Dave Peacock shares,  
I doubt our presentation could have gone much 
better. The owners and league officials in the 
meeting were generous with their time and 
thoughts on our stadium proposal, and for that 
we are extremely appreciative. As anticipated, 
we were asked a lot of good questions, and there 
is no question we had the right team in the room 
to respond on behalf of St. Louis.127 
 
In late November 2015, St. Louis Comptroller 
Darlene Green announces that she opposes the 
stadium financing plan put forth to the Board of 
Alderman, which “is not fiscally responsible.” She is 
primarily concerned with the plan creating a funding 
shortage for St. Louis City, which could hurt the city 
credit rating. If the bill is passed, she proposes 
Missouri creates a state sports authority for stadium 
financing and/or the city partner with regional 
businesses for additional funding. Along with Mayor 
Francis Slay and Board of Alderman President 
Lewis Reed, Green is a member of the three-person 
Board of Estimate and Apportionment, which 
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approves real estate, appropriations and the 
operating budget.128 
 
On December 3, 2015, Dave Peacock, as a guest 
columnist, writes a piece for the St. Louis American, 
a weekly newspaper serving the African-American 
community, advocating for the new stadium and the 
future of St. Louis. He contends the stadium 
proposal financing does not put the St. Louis City 
credit at risk, and is simply a continuation of the $6 
million a year already paid to the current stadium 
plus two thirds of new stadium tax generation. The 
city is only 15% of the total project funding since 
$850 million in funding comes from sources outside 
the city. The total funding creates 3,000 construction 
jobs and 2,600 part-time game-day jobs. Further, 
relative to minorities and the inclusion plan, two 
objectives exist: “any minority firm involved must 
come out as strong, or stronger, at the conclusion of 
the project; and we must create careers, not jobs, for 
minorities.”129 As a result, this project creates 800 
minority city jobs, resulting in $120-$140 million in 
minority wages through minority-owned firms.130 
Relative to the inclusion plan and the overall 
stadium plan, Peacock concludes,  
 
We have offered to the Board of Aldermen an 
opportunity to improve the plan and make it an 
amendment to the financing bill to further 
enhance the effectiveness of the program. Colin 
Powell has said that optimism is a force 
multiplier. It is up to us to change our future. A 
football stadium will not itself make changes for 
everyone, but $3 billion spent on development 
in our downtown and North City—with an 
aggressive minority inclusion plan and effective 
oversight—can help change lives. It is up to us 
to make prudent decisions, fueled by forward-
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thinking optimism, and recognize that it is the 
sum of many parts that make a city great.131 
   
On December 4, 2015, based upon the 
recommendations of the Committee on Los Angeles 
Opportunities, the NFL sends a deadline letter to the 
St. Louis stadium taskforce. The letter reminds them 
that teams can file for relocation starting January 4, 
2016, so a special meeting of team owners will be 
held on January 12 and 13 to consider applicable 
applications. As a result, for complete consideration 
of the possible team relocation requests to Los 
Angeles, all cities, including St. Louis, must submit 
their non-relocation proposals by Wednesday, 
December 30, 2015.132 Relative to the specific 
proposal requirements, Eric P. Grubman, NFL 
Executive Vice President, writes,  
 
The Committee would like to ensure that the 
membership has the most current and complete 
information to inform those discussions and 
therefore invites you to provide, in writing, your 
proposal to the club (including any 
modifications from your last proposal) for 
consideration by the Committee and 
membership. We request that the proposal 
include, to the extent possible, (i) a detailed 
outline of all material terms, financial and 
otherwise, (ii) specific details of the sources and 
uses for project construction, (iii) identification 
of the authority necessary to secure public 
contributions (including approvals already 
received, and projected timing of obtaining an 
additional approvals), and (iv) the timing and 
steps necessary, and remaining risks, if any, for 
you to execute the deal on the terms outlined.133 
 
On Thursday, December 10, the nine-person St. 
Louis Ways and Means Committee votes 7-2 to 
move the Stadium Bill (Board Bill 219) to the 28-
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member Board of Alderman.134 After the vote, St. 
Louis Alderwoman Megan Ellyia Green, stadium 
public funding opponent, alleges “corruption” at 
City Hall via Twitter. She claims she “had loved 
ones offered bribes for my support” and “I’m not 
alone.”135 On December 14, 2015, Board of 
Alderman President Lewis Reed considers possible 
reprimands relative to Green’s stadium statements, 
which he believes “she clearly has lied about 
this.”136 The reprimands could include a formal 
resolution by the board admonishing her comments 
and/or dismissal from subcommittees. Further, 
according to St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson, he 
and the FBI found the allegations unsubstantive, 
resulting in no criminal investigations by either the 
FBI or St. Louis Police Department.137 Through a 
statement, Green states she did “what I’d expect of 
any representative of the people to do. I’d hoped that 
I would be taken seriously even if there is not legally 
actionable evidence of corruption or bribery.”138 
 
On December 14, 2015, the Editorial Board of the 
Kansas City Star expresses concerns about the 
legislative approach used by Gov. Jay Nixon on the 
St. Louis stadium proposal. Not only is the Missouri 
General Assembly opposed to state authorization of 
funds without legislative approval or a public vote, 
but the proposed St. Louis stadium funding is 
significantly more than the $50 in tax credits 
Missouri granted Jackson County to renovate 
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Arrowhead (NFL) and Kauffman (MLB) stadiums. 
Local taxpayers paid for 80% of the $575 million in 
stadium upgrades.139 The Kansas City Star Editorial 
Board writes,  
 
It’s reasonable for Missourians on the west side 
of the state to ask what services might have to 
be sacrificed in an already stretched budget to 
pay for bond payments and tax credits for a new 
St. Louis stadium. Nixon, along with some city 
and statewide business leaders, contends that all 
efforts should be made to preserve St. Louis’ 
standing as an NFL city. A new stadium would 
revive a downtrodden area of the city and create 
a bonanza of temporary and permanent jobs, the 
governor claims. Indeed, there may be a case to 
be made for a new stadium. But Nixon should 
have done more to make it to lawmakers. His 
insistence on barging forward without a serious 
effort to overcome legislative resistance might 
have created an unmovable obstacle.140 
 
On December 15, 2015, after five hours of debate, 
the Board of Aldermen approve (17-10) the Stadium 
Bill141 despite last minute changes. The NFL now 
pledges an additional $100 million toward stadium 
construction—$300 million total, but St. Louis City 
now rebates back all ticket taxes ($3 million yearly 
projection) to the Rams or another NFL tenant. Plus, 
the football team now pays rent of $1.5 million 
yearly instead of $700,000, which helps support 
construction bonds. Further, last month, the stadium 
task force redirected the $8 million-dollar annual 
stadium naming rights to the team, totaling $158 
million. The final vote on of the Stadium Bill occurs 
December 18, 2015, and requires a 15-vote 
approval.142 
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On December 16, 2015, the St. Louis Board of 
Estimate and Apportionment approve the Stadium 
Bill with a vote of 2 to 1. Aldermanic President 
Lewis Reed and Mayor Francis Slay votes yes, and 
Comptroller Darlene Green votes no. Green does not 
find the deal to be fiscally responsible.143 
 
On December 19, 2015, the Board of Aldermen 
passes (17-10) the Stadium Bill. However, NFL 
Commissioner Goodell warns that the NFL only 
assists teams in new stadium construction with a 
maximum of $200 million, not the $300 million 
factored into the bill financing.144 Aldermanic 
President Lewis Reed advocates, “Passage of this 
financing proposal keeps us in the running for a 
billion-dollar investment on our riverfront and the 
job opportunities that would come with it. If the 
NFL approves and Kroenke does not, it could at the 
least prevent relocation of the team and the tax 
revenue it creates.”145 
 
By December 30, 2015, St. Louis, San Diego, and 
Oakland provide submissions on team non-
relocation and new stadium viability for NFL 
consideration. While Oakland did not submit a 
formal proposal, a letter outlines the city’s market 
strength and stadium concepts.146 San Diego 
provides a 41-page letter,147 which outlines a 
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previously released proposal to fund a $1.1 billion 
new stadium through a city and county total 
contribution of $350 million—pending a public 
vote.148 
 
The St. Louis submission is 400 pages, which 
includes: financial term sheet, St. Louis City 
Stadium Bill and financing plan, details of Missouri 
tax credits, architectural designs, letters of support, 
market data, and land acquisition.149 David Hunn, St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch journalist, shares,  
 
The financing plan is largely unchanged from 
that proposed to city aldermen two weeks ago. 
But it spells out a few key specifics: The new 
stadium could expand to accommodate up to 
72,000 seats for events such as a Super Bowl, 
10,000 more than normal game-day operations. 
The public stadium authority would cooperate 
with the Rams on stadium design. And the new 
plan spells out that the Rams would get all 
stadium revenue, including naming rights—but 
would pay all stadium operating and capital 
expenses.150 
 
Further, the proposed sources and uses of funds total 
$1,110,400,000. First, sources of funds are broken 
down into net private sources and net public sources. 
One, net private sources ($550,000,000) include: 
NFL team ownership ($250,000,000) and NFL G4 
Program ($300,000,000). Second, net public sources 
($560,400,000) which are contingent upon private 
sources, include: State/RSA public bonds proceeds 
($226,300,000), City project bond proceeds 
($70,400,000), Brownfields Tax Credits proceeds 
($41,100,000), MDFB contribution tax credits 
proceeds ($47,500,000), RSA funds spent to date 
($14,700,000), and proceeds from sale of seat 
licenses ($160,400,000). Second, proposed uses of 
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funds includes: stadium construction 
($917,900,000), site and riverfront development 
($76,500,000), parking construction—garage only 
($24,800,000), land acquisition ($53,000,000), site 
clearing and remediation ($17,600,000), and 
relocations ($20,600,000). Note, these sources and 
figures do not include the St. Louis City amusement 
tax rebate (present value of $65 million), which is 
rebated annually to assist in rent and operating and 
capital expenses.151 
 
On January 4, 2016, the Rams, Chargers, and 
Raiders all officially apply for Los Angeles 
relocation to the NFL.152 The Rams 29-page 
relocation application proposal argues its case 
through three key reasons: first, “the Rams 
Inglewood, California project provides the league 
with the best opportunity for success in Los 
Angeles;” secondly, “the Rams have a contract right 
to relocate from St. Louis;” and thirdly, “relocating 
the Rams from St. Louis to Los Angeles will 
strengthen the league.”153 In particular, relative to St. 
Louis, the proposal contends both San Diego and 
Oakland are significantly better markets, St. Louis 
cannot support three professional teams, financial 
team investments have not improved the market 
financial performance, and relocation of the Rams 
supports tradition and does not require NFL division 
realignment.154 Relative to the Rams relocation 
proposal, Sam Farmer and Nathan Fenno, Los 
Angeles Times reporters, state,  
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The Rams envision the stadium forming the hub 
of NFL activity on the West Coast. It includes 
the stadium—which would be nearly 3 million 
square feet—hosting the combine and Pro Bowl. 
The neighboring performance venue could be 
home to the NFL draft, NFL Honors and other 
league-themed events such as NFL Films 
premieres. Some of the office space in the 
planned mixed-use development around the 
stadium could accommodate the NFL Network, 
NFL Media and NFL Digital, allowing them 
‘dynamic new space just three miles from their 
current Culver City location.’155 
 
On January 6, 2016, in response to the Rams 
relocation application, Mayor Slay writes a letter to 
Commissioner Goodell, primarily concerning the 
inaccuracies and misrepresentation of St. Louis and 
the Rams. First, Slay, who has been mayor since 
2001, points out that the Rams have not attempted in 
good faith to achieve a St. Louis stadium solution 
since 2002, including the fact that he has not even 
met Kroenke, much less had a discussion with him. 
Second, Slay argues the viability of the St. Louis 
market, which includes: headquarters of six of the 
largest U.S. private companies, 19 Fortune 1000 
headquarters, and rank of 20th in U.S. metropolitan 
areas for both total employment and total personal 
income. St. Louis also ranks 20th out of 32 NFL 
markets in employment and personal income, 
similarity in NFL media markets, and cost of living 
is much lower than the average NFL market—
increases purchasing power.156 Slay offers, 
 
As a lifelong St. Louis resident and 30-year 
public servant, I can assure you that St. Louis is 
a nationally recognized sports town. Our 
business community is strong and bright, and I 
always stand ready to engage with the 
leadership of any business or venture to ensure 
that they can prosper and take full advantage of 
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everything our market has to offer. To that 
point, I have been and will always be ready and 
willing to engage with Stan Kroenke to forge 
the best possible future for the Rams and the 
NFL here in St. Louis. I would welcome the 
opportunity to discuss this matter in more detail. 
While I remain extremely unhappy at the 
portrayal of St. Louis in the Rams’ relocation 
submission, I am hopeful—if not confident—
that the NFL will do the right thing.157 
 
On January 7, 2016, the CVC St. Louis NFL 
Stadium Task Force sends a letter to the NFL and all 
team owners disputing the Rams relocation 
application claims through three primary 
responses.158 One, the new St. Louis stadium 
proposal is viable and financially attractive to both 
the Rams and NFL. Two, the Rams make false 
claims relative to the lease, arbitration, and their 
impact on relocation. Three, the St. Louis market is 
strong and viable relative to three professional 
teams.159 The CVC St. Louis NFL Stadium Task 
Force concludes,  
 
We were not prepared, however, for the cruel 
attack and false claims made by our local team 
owner, to his League peers, in an attempt to 
punish and embarrass St. Louis—a city whose 
residents and businesses have loyally supported 
the Rams for more than two decades. No matter 
the justification for relocation—and the 
falsehoods in the Statement of Reasons strongly 
suggest the Rams have no justification to vacate 
St. Louis—the style in which their point was 
made was unprecedented, personal, groundless 
and unbecoming of a steward representing what 
we feel is the greatest professional sports league 
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in the world. But, we want to assure the NFL of 
this: St. Louis can, and will, work with Stan 
Kroenke. No irreparable harm has been done to 
our relationship or the potential to forge a true 
partnership that will serve the NFL, the Rams 
and St. Louis for decades to come. St. Louis is 
an NFL town. It is home to the St. Louis Rams 
and our team owner is Mr. Kroenke. We look 
forward to the next chapter and sincerely 
appreciate you taking the time to consider our 
response.160 
 
On January 22, 2016, after a first vote (20-12) fails 
to get the necessary three-fourths approvals, the NFL 
owners approve (30-2) the relocation of the Rams 
from St. Louis to Los Angeles.161 Further, relative to 
the NFL resolution,162 after over 10 hours of 
presentations and negotiations, the owners also agree 
to allow the San Diego Chargers to relocate. 
However, the relocation is not to the Carson, 
California, joint stadium with the Oakland Raiders, 
but instead as a tenant in the Ram’s Inglewood 
stadium. If San Diego declines this option, the 
Raiders can then consider this option. In addition, 
the Rams and any other team moving to LA pay a 
$550 million relocation fee. Moreover, if either the 
Chargers or Raiders stay in their current hometown, 
the NFL promises an additional $100 million, so 
$300 million total, towards new stadium 
construction costs.163 Relative to the Rams 
relocation decision, Commissioner Goodell 
exclaims, “We have the return of the Los Angeles 
Rams to their home. We have a facility that is going 
to be absolutely extraordinary in the Los Angeles 
market that I think fans are going to absolutely love. 
And I think it’s going to set a new bar for all sports, 
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163 Hunn, “Goodbye, St. Louis Rams.” 
quite frankly. And, that, we’re very proud of.”164 
Kroenke adds, “It truly is bittersweet. I grew up in 
Missouri, and there’s a lot of wonderful people in St. 
Louis and Missouri. I’ll always feel that way about 
Missouri. I never dreamed I’d be put in this position. 
But at the same time, you’re not going to sit there 
and be a victim.”165 
 
Upon the relocation, the Rams instantly double in 
value to nearly $3 billion, ranking the team as not 
only one of the most valuable in the NFL but 
globally in professional sports. In September 2015, 
Forbes values the Rams at $1.45 billion, ranking 
28th out of 32 NFL teams.166 Relative to the Rams 
valuation, Michael Ozanian, Forbes’s Executive 
Editor, contends, 
  
That valuation incorporated the fact they were 
portable. We didn’t know they were going to 
Los Angeles specifically but we knew they were 
portable. That value assumed they had the 
ability to leave. It doubles the value of the team. 
The stadium is like a giant video console being 
plopped down in L.A. I don’t believe the biggest 
challenge is ‘how do I sell tickets?’ it’s ‘how do 
I market suites and hospitality when I have two 
different teams from outside markets?’ That’s 
never been done before. Here in New York you 
have the Giants and Jets sharing a stadium but 
they were both entrenched franchises that have 
been here for years, so you knew who their core 
fan bases were. Now you have two outside fan 
bases coming in to share a stadium.167 
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Further, in 2016, Forbes ranks Rams Owner Stanley 
Kroenke the richest person in Missouri168 and 148th 
in the world’s billionaires with $7.7 billion in net 
worth.169 Forbes states,  
 
Stan Kroenke took the NFL back to Los 
Angeles—and made hundreds of millions of 
dollars in the process. In August 2016 the Rams 
resumed playing in the city, which was the 
team’s home for nearly five decades before they 
moved to St. Louis in 1995. Thanks to the 
massive Los Angeles market, Forbes estimates 
the value of the Rams jumped nearly $700 
million in a single year. But Kroenke reportedly 
agreed to transfer two Denver sports franchises, 
the NBA’s Nuggets and NHL’s Avalanche—
worth more than $1.2 billion—to his wife, Wal-
Mart heiress and fellow billionaire Ann Walton 
Kroenke, as part of the move. NFL rules 
prohibit team owners from holding major sports 
teams in other NFL cities. Kroenke’s sports 
empire still includes a majority stake in English 
soccer club Arsenal and the MLS’ Colorado 
Rapids. He also oversees a real estate portfolio 
believed to include more than 30 million square 
feet—much of it shopping plazas near Wal-Mart 
stores throughout the United States—and nearly 
two million acres of ranches across the U.S. and 
Canada. In February 2016 he bought the 
massive Waggoner Ranch, which spans nearly 




St. Louis and No NFL 
While the Chargers primarily consider their options 
in San Diego and Los Angeles and the Raiders 
primarily consider their options in Oakland and Las 
Vegas, according to regional leader consensus, St. 
Louis is done with the NFL.171 Relative to the NFL, 
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Mayor Slay claims, “They were not being truthful. 
And they knew we were putting a lot of energy into 
this. We were being led on.”172 However, according 
to Commissioner Goodell, the NFL is not done with 
St. Louis.173 Relative to points made to Governor 
Nixon, Goodell contends, 
  
We have a tremendous number of fans there, as 
you know. It’s a great community and if there’s 
something that can be worked out and we can 
develop a stadium that can allow a team to be 
successful there, that’s something we should 
consider. I told him when things settle down and 
you’re prepared, let’s talk about the future of 
NFL football in St. Louis.174 
 
Instead of the NFL, St. Louis is now engaging with 
Major League Soccer (MLS). On January 22, 2016, 
the MLS Commissioner Donald Garber sends a 
letter to Mayor Slay expressing his condolences for 
loss of the Rams, but reaffirming his commitment to 
help bring MLS to St. Louis through a viable 
stadium solution.175 Garber conveys, “Like all local 
sports fans, I was both surprised (and disappointed) 
with the news of the Rams leaving St. Louis. I 
thought that your comments after the announcement 
were very appropriate.”176 On January 29, 2016, 
Mayor Slay responds via letter that he is excited 
about the possibilities with MLS by detailing the 
rich history of St. Louis with soccer and its strong 
soccer market strength.177 Slay responds, “I was 
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thrilled to receive your letter and share your 
excitement and commitment to bringing a 
professional soccer team to St. Louis, and look 
forward to working with you and a strong ownership 
group to make this vision a reality.”178 On February 
3, 2016, Commissioner Graber writes to Governor 
Nixon that he appreciates the phone call and looks 
forward to working with him to bring soccer to the 
strong St. Louis market.179 Graber states,  
 
As you know, Dave Peacock is coming to meet 
with us tomorrow. We will provide Dave with 
information on the League and our expansion 
process and we anticipate him getting us up to 
speed on the latest developments on the stadium 
front. We believe that with the right ownership 
group and the right stadium plan, St. Louis will 
undoubtedly be a leading candidate for MLS 
expansion.180 
 
As a result, an MLS taskforce of business and sports 
leaders, including St. Louis Cardinals President Bill 
DeWitt III and St. Louis Blues CEO Chris 
Zimmerman, is collaborating with the St. Louis 
Sports Commission in market, stadium, and funding 
analysis relative to potential MLS expansion and 
ownership.181 
 
As of late August 2016, while St. Louis may be 
trying to move on from the NFL, stadium costs and 
lawsuits are ongoing. The CVC is responsible for 
$16.2 million in stadium proposal expenses and at 
least $840,538 in consulting services and $137,230 
in legal services since the departure of the Rams. 
Relative to legal costs, the CVC is disputing the 
ability of the Rams to purchase their former local 
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practice facility, worth $19 million, for $1 per the 
Rams’ former Dome lease.182 Further, represented 
by John Ammann, St. Louis University Professor 
and Lawyer, three St. Louis residents, Jeanette Mott 
Oxford, Earl Garrett and William White, continue to 
try to join a lawsuit filed by the former Dome public 
board against St. Louis City to block a public 
stadium funding vote. The residents do not believe 
the city is serious in its attempts to provide an actual 
defense, and the Missouri Supreme Court has 
ordered the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern 
District, to reconsider its previous ruling to not allow 
the residents to join the lawsuit.183 
 
Key actors in the Rams saga tend to point to three 
key factors relative to the St. Louis departure: the 
NFL secret relocation ballots, public officials 
preventing a vote by the citizens and/or state 
legislature, and the Rams’ first tier stadium lease 
clause.184 However, relative to the Rams departure 
and St. Louis, the short-term loss of the Rams may 
lead to a long term win for St. Louis, especially 
relative to sustainability.185 Joe Nocera, New York 
Times Op-Ed Columnist, concludes,  
 
Don’t cry for St. Louis, sports fans. The 
departure of the Rams to Los Angeles, whence 
they came two decades ago, is something for the 
city’s residents to cheer, not bemoan. St. Louis 
got lucky. . . . But the economics underpinning 
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the recent deal St. Louis and the State of 
Missouri tried to put together to keep the Rams 
would have been financially ruinous. Let’s not 
be coy about this: St. Louis, a city of fewer than 
320,000 people, with a shrinking tax base, 
simply couldn’t afford to help finance the $1 
billion stadium that the Rams’ billionaire owner, 
E. Stanley Kroenke, was seeking. Its mistake 
was in trying. . . . The N.F.L. claims that St. 
Louis always had a real shot at retaining the 
Rams, a claim that’s hard to believe. Kroenke 
had devised plans to build not just a stadium in 
Inglewood but a huge N.F.L. complex, which 
would include retail, hotels, the whole bit. It 
was a real estate play as much as a football 
stadium play. . . . The truth is, whatever the 
deficiencies of the proposal from the city and 
state, it was more than the city, especially, could 
bear. It would have broken St. Louis’s back, and 
quite likely forced cutbacks in service that the 
city badly needs. And it raises again the 
question of whether cities should really be in the 
business of subsidizing sports facilities. Is 
keeping a football team more important [than] 
putting police officers on the street? More 
important than giving teachers raises? Of course 
not. But mayors and governors can’t bring 
themselves to tell a team good riddance when it 
threatens to leave. Instead, they move heaven 
and earth to keep the team—even if, as in the 
case of St. Louis, they can’t afford it. That’s 
why the pro sports business model works so 
well. It relies on the expectation that 
government officials will panic at the thought of 




Opposed to the locally established St. Louis 
Cardinals and St. Louis Blues, St. Louis has twice 
tried and twice failed to rent-to-own an NFL team. 
Through the Rams debacle, in an attempt to continue 
to be a major league city in perception, St. Louis 
looks like a minor league city in reality. While the 
Rams, particularly Kroenke, and the NFL did not 
engage in good faith negotiations with St. Louis, St. 
Louis did not engage in good faith negotiations with 
                                                          
186 Ibid. 
its citizens. Public officials, both elected and non-
elected, should be transparent and accountable, 
which helps prevent public servants form putting 
their private interests ahead of the public good. As a 
result, St. Louis must pursue a more sustainable 
path, especially relative to governance reform. 
Further, the Rams saga serves as a cautionary tale to 
governments throughout the United States, 
particularly in corporate welfare and infrastructure 
(private) versus social welfare and infrastructure 
(public). In public-private partnerships, the devil is 
in the details. 
 
